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Beyond the EULA: Improving consent for data
mining
Luke Hutton and Tristan Henderson
Abstract Companies and academic researchers may collect, process, and distribute
large quantities of personal data without the explicit knowledge or consent of the
individuals to whom the data pertains. Existing forms of consent often fail to be
appropriately readable and ethical oversight of data mining may not be sufficient.
This raises the question of whether existing consent instruments are sufficient, lo-
gistically feasible, or even necessary, for data mining. In this chapter, we review
the data collection and mining landscape, including commercial and academic ac-
tivities, and the relevant data protection concerns, to determine the types of consent
instruments used. Using three case studies, we use the new paradigm of human-data
interaction to examine whether these existing approaches are appropriate. We then
introduce an approach to consent that has been empirically demonstrated to improve
on the state of the art and deliver meaningful consent. Finally, we propose some best
practices for data collectors to ensure their data mining activities do not violate the
expectations of the people to whom the data relate.
1 Introduction
The ability of companies to collect, process, and distribute large quantities of per-
sonal data, and to further analyse, mine and generate new data based on inferences
from these data, is often done without the explicit knowledge or consent of the in-
dividuals to whom the data pertains. Consent instruments such as privacy notices
or End User License Agreements (EULAs) are widely deployed, often presenting
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individuals with thousands of words of legal jargon that they may not read nor com-
prehend, before soliciting agreement in order to make use of a service. Indeed, even
if an individual does have a reasonable understanding of the terms to which they
have agreed, such terms are often carefully designed to extend as much flexibility
to the data collector as possible to obtain even more data, distribute them to more
stakeholders, and make inferences by linking data from multiple sources, despite no
obvious agreement to these new practices.
The lack of transparency behind data collection and mining practices threatens
the agency and privacy of data subjects, with no practical way to control these invisi-
ble data flows, nor correct misinformation or inaccurate and inappropriate inferences
derived from linked data. Existing data protection regimes are often insufficient as
they are predicated on the assumption that an individual is able to detect when a
data protection violation has occurred in order to demand recourse, which is rarely
the case when data are opaquely mined at scale.
These challenges are not unique to commercial activities, however. Academic re-
searchers often make use of datasets containing personal information, such as those
collected from social network sites or devices such as mobile phones or fitness track-
ers. Most researchers are bound by an obligation to seek ethical approval from an
institutional review board (IRB) before conducting their research. The ethical pro-
tocols used, however, are inherited from post-war concerns regarding biomedical
experiments, and may not be appropriate for Internet-mediated research, where mil-
lions of data points can be collected without any personal interventions. This raises
the question of whether existing consent instruments are sufficient, logistically fea-
sible, or even necessary, for research of this nature.
In this chapter we first review the data collection and mining landscape, includ-
ing commercial and academic activities, and the relevant data protection laws, to
determine the types of consent instruments used. Employing the newly-proposed
paradigm of Human-Data Interaction, we examine three case studies to determine
whether these mechanisms are sufficient to uphold the expectations of individuals, to
provide them with sufficient agency, legibility and negotiability, and whether privacy
norms are violated by secondary uses of data which are not explicitly sanctioned by
individuals. We then discuss various new dynamic and contextual approaches to
consent, which have been empirically demonstrated to improve on the state of the
art and deliver meaningful consent. Finally, we propose some best practices that
data collectors can adopt to ensure their data mining activities do not violate the
expectations of the people to whom the data relate.
2 Background
Data mining is the statistical analysis of large-scale datasets to extract additional
patterns and trends [16]. This has allowed commercial, state, and academic actors
to answer questions which have not previously been possible, due to insufficient
data, analytical techniques, or computational power. Data mining is often charac-
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terised by the use of aggregate data to identify traits and trends which allow the
identification and characterisation of clusters of people rather than individuals, as-
sociations between events, and forecasting of future events. As such, it has been
used in a number of real-world scenarios such as optimising the layout of retail
stores, attempts to identify disease trends, and mass surveillance. Many classical
data mining and knowledge discovery applications involve businesses or market-
ing [12], such as clustering consumers into groups and attempting to predict their
behaviour. This may allow a business to understand their customers and target pro-
motions appropriately. Such profiling can, however, be used to characterise individ-
uals for the purpose of denying service when extending credit, leasing a property,
or acquiring insurance. In such cases, the collection and processing of sensitive data
can be invasive, with significant implications for the individual, particularly where
decisions are made on the basis of inferences that may not be accurate, and to which
the individual is given no right of reply. This has become more important of late,
as more recent data mining applications involve the analysis of personal data, much
of which is collected by individuals and contributed to marketers in what has been
termed “self-surveillance” [25]. Such personal data have been demonstrated to be
highly valuable [48], and have even been described as the new “oil” in terms of the
value of their resource [55]. Value aside, such data introduce new challenges for
consent as they can often be combined to create new inferences and profiles where
previously data would have been absent [17].
Table 1 Some relevant EU legislation that may apply to data mining activities
Legislation Some relevant sections
Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC Data processing (Art 1), fair processing (Art 6(1)), pur-
pose limitation (Art 6(2)), proportionality (Art 6(3)),
consent (Art 7(1)), sensitive data (Art 8)
E-Privacy Directive 2002/58/EC as
amended by 2009/136/EC
cookies (Art 5), traffic data (Art 6), location data (Art
9), unsolicited communication (Art 13)
General Data Protection Regulation
2016/679
Consent (Art 7), right to be forgotten (Art 17), right to
explanation (Art 22), privacy by design (Art 25)
Data mining activities are legitimised through a combination of legal and self-
regulatory behaviours. In the European Union, the Data Protection Directive [10],
and the forthcoming General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) that will suc-
ceed it in 2018 [11] govern how data mining can be conducted legitimately. The
e-Privacy Directive also further regulates some specific aspects of data mining such
as cookies (Table 1). In the United States, a self-regulatory approach is generally
preferred, with the Federal Trade Commission offering guidance regarding privacy
protections [42], consisting of six core principles, but lacking the coverage or legal
backing of the EU’s approach.
Under the GDPR, the processing of personal data for any purpose, including data
mining, is subject to explicit opt-in consent from an individual, prior to which the
data controller must explicitly state what data are collected, the purpose of process-
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ing them, and the identity of any other recipients of the data. Although there are a
number of exceptions, consent must generally be sought for individual processing
activities, and cannot be broadly acquired a priori for undefined future uses, and
there are particular issues with data mining, transparency and accountability [7].
Solove [47] acknowledges these regulatory challenges, arguing that paternalistic
approaches are not appropriate, as these deny people the freedom to consent to par-
ticular beneficial uses of their data. The timing of consent requests and the focus of
these requests need to be managed carefully; such thinking has also become appar-
ent in the GDPR.1 The call for dynamic consent is consistent with Nissenbaum’s
model of contextual integrity [39], which posits that all information exchanges are
subject to context-specific norms, which governs to whom and for what purpose
information sharing can be considered appropriate. When the context is disrupted,
perhaps by changing with whom data are shared, or for what purpose, privacy vio-
lations can occur when this is not consistent with the norms of the existing context.
Therefore, consent can help to uphold contextual integrity by ensuring that if the
context is perturbed, consent is renegotiated, rather than assumed.
Reasoning about how personal data are used has resulted in a new paradigm,
human-data interaction, which places humans at the centre of data flows and pro-
vides a framework for studying personal data collection and use according to three
themes [35]:
• Legibility: Often, data owners are not aware that data mining is even taking place.
Even if they are, they may not know what is being collected or analysed, the
purpose of the analysis, or the insights derived from it.
• Agency: The opaque nature of data mining often denies data owners agency.
Without any engagement in the practice, people have no ability to provide mean-
ingful consent, if they are asked to give consent at all, nor correct flawed data or
review inferences made based on their data.
• Negotiability: The context in which data are collected and processed can often
change, whether through an evolving legislative landscape, data being traded be-
tween organisations, or through companies unilaterally changing their privacy
policies or practices. Analysis can be based on the linking of datasets derived
from different stakeholders, allowing insights that no single provider could make.
This is routinely the case in profiling activities such as credit scoring. Even where
individuals attempt to obfuscate their data to subvert this practice, it is often pos-
sible to re-identify them from such linked data [38]. Data owners should have
the ability to review how their data are used as circumstances change in order to
uphold contextual integrity.
Early data protection regulation in the 1980s addressed the increase in electronic
data storage and strengthened protections against unsolicited direct marketing [49].
Mail order companies were able to develop large databases of customer details to
enable direct marketing, or the trading of such information between companies.
1 e.g., Article 7(3) which allows consent to be withdrawn, and Article 17 on the “right to be
forgotten” which allows inferences and data to be erased.
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When acquiring consent for the processing of such information became mandatory,
such as under the 1984 Data Protection Act in the UK, this generally took the form
of a checkbox on paper forms, where a potential customer could indicate their will-
ingness for secondary processing of their data. As technology has evolved away
from mail-in forms being the primary means of acquiring personal information, and
the scope and intent of data protection moves from regulating direct marketing to
a vast range of data-processing activities, there has been little regulatory attention
paid to how consent is acquired. As such, consent is often acquired by asking a
user to tick a checkbox to opt-in or out of secondary use of their data. This practice
is well-entrenched, where people are routinely asked to agree to an End-User Li-
cence Agreement (EULA) before accessing software, and multiple terms of service
and privacy policies before accessing online services, generally consisting of a long
legal agreement and an “I Agree” button.
A significant body of research concludes that such approaches to acquiring con-
sent are flawed. Luger et al. find that the terms and conditions provided by major
energy companies are not sufficiently readable, excluding many from being able
to make informed decisions about whether they agree to such terms [29]. Indeed,
Obar and Oeldorf-Hirsch find that the vast majority of people do not even read
such documents [40], with all participants in a user study accepting terms includ-
ing handing over their first-born child to use a social network site. McDonald and
Cranor measure the economic cost of reading lengthy policies [31], noting the in-
equity of expecting people to spend an average of ten minutes of their time reading
and comprehending a complex document in order to use a service. Freidman et al.
caution that simply including more information and more frequent consent interven-
tions can be counter-productive, by frustrating people and leading them to making
more complacent consent decisions [13].
Academic data mining is subject to a different regulatory regime, with fewer
constraints over the secondary use of data from a data protection perspective. This
is balanced by an ethical review regime, rooted in post-war concern over a lack of
ethical rigour in biomedical research. In the US, ethical review for human subjects
research via an institutional review board (IRB) is necessary to receive federal fund-
ing, and the situation is similar in many other countries. One of the central tenets of
ethical human research is to acquire informed consent before a study begins [5]. As
such, institutions have developed largely standardised consent instruments [1] which
researchers can use to meet these requirements. While in traditional lab-based stud-
ies, these consent procedures can be accompanied by an explanation of the study
from a researcher, or the opportunity for a participant to ask any questions, this af-
fordance is generally not available in online contexts, effectively regressing to the
flawed EULAs discussed earlier.
Some of these weaknesses have been examined in the literature. Hamnes et al.
find that consent documents in rheumatological studies are not sufficiently readable
for the majority of the population [15], a finding which is supported by Vucˇemilo
and Borovecˇki who also find that medical consent forms often exclude important
information [53]. Donovan-Kicken et al. examine the sources of confusion when
reviewing such documents [8], which include insufficient discussion of risk and
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lengthy or overly complex language. Munteanu et al. examine the ethics approval
process in a number of HCI research case studies, finding that participants often
agreed to consent instruments they have not read or understood, and the rigidity of
such processes can often be at odds with such studies where a “situational interpre-
tation” of an agreed protocol is needed [36]. There also lacks agreement among re-
searchers about how to conduct such research in an ethical manner, with Vitak et al.
finding particular variability regarding whether data should be collected at large
scale without consent, or if acquiring consent in such cases is even possible [52].
Existing means of acquiring consent are inherited from a time when the scope
of data collection and processing was perhaps constrained and could be well under-
stood. Now, even when the terms of data collection and processing are understood
as written, whether registering for an online service, or participating in academic
research, it is not clear that the form of gaining the consent was meaningful, or
sufficient. Someone may provide consent to secondary use of their data, without
knowing what data this constitutes, who will be able to acquire it, for what purpose,
or when. This is already a concern when considering the redistribution and process-
ing of self-disclosed personally identifiable information, but becomes increasingly
complex when extended to historical location data, shopping behaviours, or social
network data, much of which are not directly provided by the individual, and are
nebulous in scale and content. Moreover concerns may change over time (the so-
called “privacy paradox” [3] that has been demonstrated empirically [2, 4]), which
may require changes to previously-granted consent.
Returning to our three themes of legibility, agency, and negotiability, we can see
that:
• Existing EULAs and consent forms may not meet a basic standard of legibility,
alienating significant areas of the population from understanding what they are
being asked to agree to. Furthermore, the specific secondary uses of their data
are often not explained.
• EULAs and consent forms are often only used to secure permission once, then
often never again, denying people agency to revoke their consent when a material
change in how their data are used arises.
• Individuals have no power to meaningfully negotiate how their data are used,
nor to intelligently adopt privacy-preserving behaviours, as they generally do not
know which data attributed to them is potentially risky.
3 Case studies
In this section we examine a number of real-world case studies to identify instances
where insufficient consent mechanisms were employed, failing to provide people
with legibility, agency, and negotiability.
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3.1 Taste, Ties, and Time
In 2006, researchers at Harvard University collected a dataset of Facebook profiles
from a cohort of undergraduate students, named “Tastes, Ties and Time” (T3) [28].
At the time, Facebook considered individual universities to comprise networks
where members of the institution could access the full content of each other’s pro-
files, despite not having an explicit friendship with each other on the service. This
design was exploited by having research assistants at the same institution manually
extract the profiles of each member of the cohort.
Subsequently, an anonymised version of the dataset was made publicly available,
with student names and identifiers removed, and terms and conditions for download-
ing the dataset made it clear that deanonymisation was not permitted. Unfortunately,
this proved insufficient, with aggregate statistics such as the size of the cohort mak-
ing it possible to infer the college the dataset was derived from, and as some de-
mographic attributes were only represented by a single student, it was likely that
individuals could be identified [56].
Individuals were not aware that the data collection took place, and did not consent
to its collection, processing, nor subsequent release. As such, this case falls short in
our themes for acceptable data-handling practices:
• Legibility: Individuals were not aware their data was collected or subsequently
released. With a tangible risk of individuals being identified without their knowl-
edge, the individual is not in a position to explore any legal remedies to hold
Facebook or the researchers responsible for any resulting harms. In addition,
even if consent were sought, it can be difficult for individuals to conceptualise
exactly which of their data would be included, considering the large numbers
of photos, location traces, status updates, and biographical information a typi-
cal user might accrue over years, without an accessible means of visualising or
selectively disclosing these data.
• Agency: Without notification, individual users had no way to opt-out of the data
collection, nor prevent the release of their data. As a side-effect of Facebook’s
university-only network structure at the time, the only way for somebody to avoid
their data being used in such a manner was to leave these institution networks,
losing much of the utility of the service in the process. This parallels Facebook’s
approach to releasing other products, such as the introduction of News Feed in
2006. By broadcasting profile updates to one’s network, the effective visibility of
their data was substantially increased, with no way to opt-out of the feature with-
out leaving the service entirely. This illusory loss of control was widely criticised
at the time [20].
• Negotiability: In this respect, the user’s relationship with Facebook itself is sig-
nificant. In addition to IRB approval, the study was conducted with Facebook’s
permission [28], but Facebook’s privacy policy at the time did not allow for Face-
book to share their data with the researchers.2 Therefore, the existing context
2 Facebook Privacy Policy, February 2006: http://web.archive.org/web/
20060406105119/http://www.facebook.com/policy.php
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for sharing information on Facebook was disrupted by this study. This includes
the normative expectation that data are shared with Facebook for the purpose
of sharing information with one’s social network, and not myriad third parties.
In addition, no controls were extended to the people involved to prevent it from
happening, or to make a positive decision to permit this new information-sharing
context.
3.2 Facebook emotional contagion experiment
In 2012, researchers at Facebook and Cornell University conducted a large-scale ex-
periment on 689,003 Facebook users. The study manipulated the presentation of sto-
ries in Facebook’s News Feed product, which aggregates recent content published
by a user’s social network, to determine whether biasing the emotional content of the
news feed affected the emotions that people expressed in their own disclosures [27].
While the T3 study highlighted privacy risks of nonconsensual data sharing, the
emotional contagion experiment raises different personal risks from inappropriate
data mining activities. For example, for a person suffering from depression, being
subjected to a news feed of predominantly depressive-indicative content could have
catastrophic consequences, particularly considering the hypothesis of the experi-
ment that depressive behaviour would increase under these circumstances. Consid-
ering the scale at which the experiment was conducted, there was no mechanism
for excluding such vulnerable people, nor measuring the impact on individuals to
mitigate such harms. Furthermore, as the study was not age-restricted, children may
have unwittingly been subjected to the study [19]. Rucuber notes that the harms to
any one individual in such experiments can be masked by the scale of the experi-
ment [43].
Beyond the research context, this case highlights the broader implications of the
visibility of media, whether socially-derived or from mainstream media, being al-
gorithmically controlled. Napoli argues that this experiment highlights Facebook’s
ability to shape public discourse by altering the news feed’s algorithm to introduce
political bias [37], without any governance to ensure that such new media are acting
in the public interest. The majority of Facebook users do not know that such filtering
happens at all, and the selective presentation of content from one’s social network
can cause social repercussions where the perception is that individuals are withhold-
ing posts from someone, rather than an algorithmic intervention by Facebook [9].
This case shows one of the greater risks of opaque data mining. Where people
are unaware such activities are taking place, they lose all power to act autonomously
to minimise the risk to themselves, even putting aside the responsibility of the re-
searchers in this instance. We now consider how this case meets our three core
themes:
• Legibility: Individuals were unaware that they were participants in the research.
They would have no knowledge or understanding of the algorithms which choose
which content is presented on the news feed, and how they were altered for this
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experiment, nor that the news feed is anything other than a chronological collec-
tion of content provided by their social network. Without this insight, the cause of
a perceptible change in the emotional bias in the news feed can not be reasoned.
Even if one is aware that the news feed is algorithmically controlled, without
knowing which data are collected or used in order to determine the relevance of
individual stories, it is difficult to reason why certain stories are displayed.
• Agency: As in the T3 case, without awareness of the experiment being con-
ducted, individuals were unable to provide consent, nor opt-out of the study.
Without an understanding of the algorithms which drive the news feed, nor how
they were adjusted for the purposes of this experiment, individuals are unable to
take actions, such as choosing which information to disclose or hide from Face-
book in an effort to control the inferences Facebook makes, nor to correct any
inaccurate inferences. At the most innocuous level, this might be where Face-
book has falsely inferred a hobby or interest, and shows more content relating to
that. Of greater concern is when Facebook, or the researchers in this study, are
unable to detect when showing more depressive-indicative content could present
a risk.
• Negotiability: In conducting this study, Facebook unilaterally changed the rela-
tionship its users have with the service, exploiting those who are unable to control
how their information is used [45]. At the time of the study, the Terms of Service
to which users agree when joining Facebook did not indicate that data could be
used for research purposes [19], a clause which was added after the data were
collected. As a commercial operator collaborating with academic researchers,
the nature of the study was ambiguous, with Facebook having an internal product
improvement motivation, and Cornell researchers aiming to contribute to gener-
alisable knowledge. Cornell’s IRB deemed that they did not need to review the
study because Facebook provided the data, 3, but the ethical impact on the unwit-
ting participants is not dependent on who collected the data. As Facebook has no
legal requirement to conduct an ethical review of their own research, and without
oversight from the academic collaborators, these issues did not surface earlier.
Facebook has since adopted an internal ethics review process [24], however it
makes little reference to mitigating the impact on participants, and mostly aims
to maximise benefit to Facebook. Ultimately, these actions by researchers and
institutions with which individuals have no prior relationship serve to disrupt
the existing contextual norms concerning people’s relationship with Facebook,
without extending any ability to renegotiate this relationship.
3.3 NHS sharing data with Google
In February 2016, the Google subsidiary DeepMind announced a collaboration with
the National Health Service’s Royal Free London Trust to build a mobile application
3 Cornell statement: https://perma.cc/JQ2L-TEXQ
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titled Streams to support the detection of acute kidney injury (AKI) using machine
learning techniques. The information sharing agreement permitting this collabora-
tion gives DeepMind ongoing and historical access to all identifiable patient data
collected by the trust’s three hospitals [22].
While the project is targeted at supporting those at risk of AKI, data relating
to all patients are shared with DeepMind, whether they are at risk or not. There
is no attempt to gain the consent of those patients, or to provide an obvious opt-
out mechanism. The trust’s privacy policy only allows data to be shared without
explicit consent for “your direct care”. 4 Considering that Streams is only relevant
to those being tested for kidney disease, it follows that for most people, their data
are collected and processed without any direct care benefit [21], in violation of this
policy. Given the diagnostic purpose of the app, such an application could constitute
a medical device, however no regulatory approval was sought by DeepMind or the
trust [21].
Permitting private companies to conduct data mining within the medical domain
disrupts existing norms, by occupying a space that lies between direct patient care
and academic research. Existing ethical approval and data-sharing regulatory mech-
anisms have not been employed, or are unsuitable for properly evaluating the po-
tential impacts of such work. By not limiting the scope of the data collection nor
acquiring informed consent, there is no opportunity for individuals to protect their
data. In addition, without greater awareness of the collaboration, broader public
debate about the acceptability of the practice is avoided, which is of importance
considering the sensitivity of the data involved. Furthermore, this fairly limited col-
laboration can normalise a broader sharing of data in the future, an eventuality which
is more likely given an ongoing strategic partnership forged between DeepMind and
the trust [21]. We now consider this case from the perspective of our three themes:
• Legibility: Neither patients who could directly benefit from improved detection
of AKI, nor all other hospital patients, were aware that their data were being
shared with DeepMind. Indeed, this practice in many data mining activities –
identifying patterns to produce insight from myriad data – risks violating a fun-
damental principle of data protection regulation; that of proportionality [11].
• Agency: The NHS collects data from its functions in a number of databases, such
as the Secondary Uses Service which provides a historical record of treatments
in the UK, and can be made available to researchers. Awareness of this database
and its research purpose is mostly constrained to leaflets and posters situated in
GP practices. If patients wish to opt-out of their data being used they must insist
on it, and are likely to be reminded of the public health benefit and discouraged
from opting-out [6]. Without being able to assume awareness of the SUS, nor in-
dividual consent being acquired, it is difficult for individuals to act with agency.
Even assuming knowledge of this collaboration, it would require particular un-
derstanding of the functions of the NHS to know that opting-out of the SUS
would limit historical treatment data made available to DeepMind. Even where
someone is willing to share their data to support their direct care, they may wish
4 Royal Free London Trust Privacy Statement: https://perma.cc/33YE-LYPF
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to redact information relating to particularly sensitive diagnoses or treatments,
but have no mechanism to do so.
• Negotiability: The relationship between patients and their clinicians is embodied
in complex normative expectations of confidentiality which are highly context-
dependent [44]. Public understanding of individual studies is already low [6],
and the introduction of sophisticated data mining techniques into the diagnos-
tic process which existing regulatory mechanisms are not prepared for disrupts
existing norms around confidentiality and data sharing. The principle of negotia-
bility holds that patients should be able to review their willingness to share data
as their context changes, or the context in which the data are used. Existing in-
stitutions are unable to uphold this, and the solution may lie in increased public
awareness and debate, and review of policy and regulatory oversight to reason a
more appropriate set of norms.
How each of these case studies meets the principles of legibility, agency, and
negotiability is summarised in Table 2.
Case study HDI principle How was principle violated?
Taste, Ties and Time
Legibility Individuals unaware of data collection
Agency No way to opt-out of data collection
Negotiability Data collection violated normative expectation
with Facebook
Facebook emotional
contagion experiment
Legibility Individuals unaware they were participants
Agency No way to opt-out of participation
Negotiability Research not permitted by Facebook’s terms
NHS sharing data with
Google
Legibility Patients unaware of data sharing
Agency Poor awareness of secondary uses of data and dif-
ficulty of opting out
Negotiability Data mining can violate normative expectations
of medical confidentiality
Table 2 Summary of how the three case studies we examine violate the principles of human-data
interaction
4 Alternative consent models
In Section 2 we discussed some of the shortcomings with existing means of acquir-
ing consent for academic research and commercial services including data mining,
and discussed three case studies in Section 3. Many of the concerns in these case
studies revolved around an inability to provide or enable consent on the part of par-
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ticipants. We now discuss the state-of-the-art in providing meaningful consent for
today’s data-mining activities.
The acquisition of informed consent can broadly be considered to be secured or
sustained in nature [30]. Secured consent encompasses the forms we discussed in
Section 2, where consent is gated by a single EULA or consent form at the begin-
ning of the data collection process and not revisited. Conversely, sustained consent
involves ongoing reacquisition of consent over the period that the data are collected
or used. This might mean revisiting consent when the purpose of the data collec-
tion or processing has changed, such as if data are to be shared with different third
parties, or if the data subject’s context has changed. Each interaction can be viewed
as an individual consent transaction [32]. In research, this can also mean extend-
ing more granular control to participants over which of their data are collected,
such as in Sleeper et al.’s study into self-censorship behaviours on Facebook, where
participants could choose which status updates they were willing to share with re-
searchers [46]. This approach has a number of advantages. Gaining consent after the
individual has had experience with a particular service or research study may allow
subjects to make better-informed decisions than a sweeping form of secured con-
sent. Furthermore, sustained consent can allow participants to make more granular
decisions about what they would be willing to share, with a better understanding
of the context, rather than a single consent form or EULA being considered carte
blanche for unconstrained data collection.
The distinction between secured and sustained consent reveals a tension between
two variables: burden – the time spent and cognitive load required to negotiate the
consent process, and accuracy – the extent to which the effect of a consent deci-
sion corresponds with a person’s expectations. While a secured instrument such as
a consent form minimises the burden on the individual, with only a single form to
read and comprehend, the accuracy is impossible to discern, with no process for
validating that consent decision in context, nor to assess the individual’s compre-
hension of what they have agreed to. Conversely, while a sustained approach – such
as asking someone whether they are willing for each item of personal data to be used
for data mining activities – may improve accuracy, the added burden is significant
and can be frustrating, contributing to attrition, which is particularly problematic in
longitudinal studies [18].
In some domains other than data mining, this distinction has already been ap-
plied. In biomedical research, the consent to the use of samples is commonly distin-
guished as being broad or dynamic. Broad consent allows samples to be used for a
range of experiments within an agreed framework without consent being explicitly
required [50], whereas dynamic consent involves ongoing engagement with partici-
pants, allowing them to see how their samples are used, and permitting renegotiation
of consent if the samples are to be used for different studies, or if the participant’s
wishes change [26]. Despite the differences from the data mining domain, the same
consent challenges resonate.
Various researchers have proposed ways of minimising the burden of consent,
while simultaneously collecting meaningful and accurate information from people.
Williams et al. look at sharing medical data, enhancing agency with a dynamic con-
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sent model that enables control of data electronically, and improved legibility by
providing patients with information about how their data are used [54]. Gomer et al.
propose the use of agents who make consent decisions on behalf of individuals to
reduce the burden placed on them, based on preferences they have expressed which
are periodically reviewed [14]. Moran et al. suggest that consent can be negotiated
in multi-agent environments by identifying interaction patterns to determine appro-
priate times to acquire consent [33].
We have discussed legibility as an important aspect of HDI, and Morrison et al.
study how to visualise collected data to research participants [34]. Personalised vi-
sualisations led participants in an empirical study to exit the study earlier, which
might mean that secured consent was leading participants to continue beyond the
appropriate level of data collection. In much earlier work, Patrick looked at present-
ing user agreements contextually (rather than at the beginning of a transaction as in
secured consent) and developed a web-based widget to do so [41].
Such dynamic approaches to consent are not universally supported. Steinsbekk
et al. suggest that where data are re-used for multiple studies, there is no need to
acquire consent for each one where there are no significant ethical departures be-
cause of the extra burden, arguing that it puts greater responsibility on individuals
to discern whether a study is ethically appropriate than existing governance struc-
tures [50].
In previous work, we have developed a method for acquiring consent which aims
to maximise accuracy and minimise burden, satisfying both requirements, bringing
some of the principles of dynamic consent to the data mining domain [23], while
aiming to maintain contextual integrity by respecting prevailing social norms. While
many of the consent approaches discussed in this chapter may satisfy a legal re-
quirement, it is not clear that this satisfies the expectations of individuals or society
at large, and thus may violate contextual integrity.
In a user study, we examine whether prevailing norms representing willingness
to share specific types of Facebook data with researchers, along with limited data
about an individual’s consent preferences, can be used to minimise burden and max-
imise accuracy. The performance of these measures were compared to two controls:
one for accuracy and for burden. In the first instance, a sustained consent process
which gains permission for the use of each individual item of Facebook data would
maximise accuracy while pushing great burden on to the individual. Secondly, a
single consent checkbox minimises burden, while also potentially minimising the
accuracy of the method. The contextual integrity method works similarly to this ap-
proach, by asking a series of consent questions until the individual’s conformity to
the social norm can be inferred, at which point no more questions are asked.
For 27.7% of participants, this method is able to achieve high accuracy of 96.5%
while reducing their burden by an average of 41.1%. This is highlighted in Fig-
ure 1, showing a cluster of norm-conformant participants achieving high accuracy
and low burden. This indicates that for this segment of the population, the contextual
integrity approach both improves accuracy and reduces burden compared to their re-
spective controls. While this does indicate the approach is not suitable for all people,
norm conformity is able to be quickly determined within six questions. Where one
14 Luke Hutton and Tristan Henderson
0%
25%
50%
75%
100%
5% 10% 15% 20% 25%
Burden
Ac
cu
ra
cy
Conformity determination
Conforms
Deviates
Undetermined
Fig. 1 Scatterplot showing the relationship between norm conformity and accuracy. As indicated
by the cluster after 5 questions (5% burden), high accuracy can be preserved when norm conformity
is detected quickly, although the technique is not useful for people who are highly norm deviant.
Note that the points have been jittered to improve readability. [23]
does not conform to the norm, the sustained approach can be automatically used
as a fallback, which maintains accuracy at the cost of a greater time burden on the
individual. Even in less optimal cases, the technique can reduce the burden by an
average of 21.9%.
While the technique assessed in this user study is prototypical in its nature, it
highlights the potential value of examining alternative means of acquiring consent,
which has seen little innovation in both academic and commercial domains. More-
over, while this technique is not universally applicable, this only highlights that the
diversity of perspectives, willingness to engage, and ability to comprehend consent
language requires a plurality of approaches.
5 Discussion
In this chapter we have illustrated how data mining activities, in both academic and
commercial contexts, are often opaque by design. Insufficient consent mechanisms
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can prevent people from understanding what they are agreeing to, particularly where
the scope of the data collected or with whom it is shared is changed without consent
being renegotiated. Indeed, as in our three case studies, consent is often not sought
at all.
We have considered the impacts of opaque data mining in terms of legibility,
agency, and negotiability. We now propose some best practices for conducting data
mining which aim to satisfy these three themes.
5.1 Legibility
In order to make data mining more acceptable, it is not sufficient to simply make
processes more transparent. Revealing the algorithms, signals, and inferences may
satisfy a particularly technically competent audience, but for most people does not
help them understand what happens to their data, in order to make an informed
decision over whether to consent, or how they can act with any agency.
The incoming General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in the European
Union requires consent language to be concise, transparent, intelligible and eas-
ily accessible [11], which as indicated in the literature, is currently not a universal
practice. As highlighted in our three case studies, the absence of any meaningful
consent enabling data to be used beyond its original context, such as a hospital or
social network site, is unacceptable. Even without adopting more sophisticated ap-
proaches to consent as discussed in Section 4, techniques to notify and reacquire
consent such that people are aware and engaged with ongoing data mining practices
can be deployed. As discussed earlier, a practical first step is to ensure all consent
documents can be understood by a broad spectrum of the population.
5.2 Agency
Assuming that legibility has been satisfied, and people are able to understand how
their data are being used, the next challenge is to ensure people are able to act
autonomously and control how their data are used beyond a single consent decision.
Some ways of enabling this include ensuring people can subsequently revoke their
consent for their data to be used at any time, without necessarily being precipitated
by a change in how the data are used. In the GDPR, this is enshrined through the
right to be forgotten [11] that includes the cascading revocation of data between data
controllers.
Legibility can also enable agency by allowing people to act in a certain way in
order to selectively allow particular inferences to be made. By being able to choose
what they are willing to share with a data collector in order to satisfy their own
utility, some of the power balance can be restored, which has been previously tipped
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towards the data collector who is able to conduct analyses at a scale beyond any
individual subject’s capabilities.
5.3 Negotiability
As discussed in Section 4, Nissenbaum’s contextual integrity [39] can be used to
detect privacy violations when the terms of data-handling have changed in such
a way that existing norms are breached. The principle of negotiability is key to
preventing this, by allowing people to make ongoing decisions about how their data
are used as contexts evolve, whether their own, environmentally, or that of the data
collector.
Dynamic consent in the biobanks context [26] could be adapted to allow data
subjects to be notified and review how their data are being used, whether for new
purposes or shared with new actors, allowing consent to be renegotiated. Our con-
sent method informed by contextual integrity [23] is one such approach which aims
to tackle this problem, by allowing people to make granular consent decisions with-
out being overwhelmed. Adopting the principles of the GDPR, which emphasises
dynamic consent, can support negotiability, with guidance made available for or-
ganisations wishing to apply these principles [51].
6 Conclusion
Data mining is an increasingly pervasive part of daily life, with the large-scale col-
lection, processing, and distribution of personal data being used for myriad pur-
poses. In this chapter, we have outlined how this often happens without consent,
or the consent instruments used are overly complex or inappropriate. Data mining
is outgrowing existing regulatory and ethical governance structures, and risks vio-
lating entrenched norms about the acceptable use of personal data, as illustrated in
case studies spanning the commercial and academic spheres. We argue that organ-
isations involved in data mining should provide legible consent information such
that people can understand what they are agreeing to, support people’s agency by
allowing them to selectively consent to different processing activities, and to sup-
port negotiability by allowing people to review or revoke their consent as the con-
text of the data mining changes. We have discussed recent work which dynamically
negotiates consent, including a technique which leverages social norms to acquire
granular consent without overburdening people. We call for greater public debate to
negotiate these new social norms collectively, rather than allowing organisations to
unilaterally impose new practices without oversight.
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